23 years after 9/11: why a new approach to combating terrorism is needed

When members of Al Qaeda crashed commercial airliners into the World Trade Center in New York on September 11, 2001, the idea of ​​who a terrorist was crystallized for the world. But 23 years later, the reality is that there is no “type” of terrorist. As law enforcement around the world confront a myriad of threats from all types of groups, an essential understanding of who the opponent is becomes crucial.

The good, the evil and the terrorist

A person is a terrorist for what he does, not for what he believes, and he is prosecuted for his actions.

Talking about terrorism in terms of the theory of “good and evil” is counterproductive and meaningless. Even if we all agree that terrorism is the expression of evil, it is not possible to reach an agreement on who the terrorists are.

Moreover, in a world of conflict, the same effect can be generated by terrorists, insurgents, freedom fighters and other groups who use violence and do the same thing, for different reasons and with a different label.

The whole question of the “rightness or wrongness” of an action depends on the reasons that motivate it, so again this is a vague criterion. Acceptance or rejection of actions cannot depend on the value of “rightness or wrongness,” nor on the reasons that generate them.

This is therefore one more reason to change the way we measure terrorism, forgetting about “right and wrong,” and focusing instead on the results of terrorism, banning its effects that we cannot accept. Those effects, unlike the ideas that constitute the motivations, can be counted and measured. When “an act of terrorism is such because of the effects it generates, and not because of the causes that prompted it,” then the way is open for everyone to agree on a common strategy to counter terrorism.

Definition of terrorism

Ten years after 9/11, Alex P. Schmid, Distinguished Fellow at the International Centre for Counterterrorism (ICCT) and Director of the Terrorism Research Initiative (TRI), gathered the opinions of dozens of experts to arrive at a scientific definition of terrorism for the 21st century.

The result has been a long list of characteristics, among which the objective of “terrorizing” stands out, identifying communication as a specific element of terrorism, and the use of violence, directed indiscriminately against “civilian” targets.

This plethora of definitions makes it difficult to develop a common operational perspective to counter terrorist threats.

Unfortunately, many definitions of terrorism refer to the experience of this phenomenon acquired in a world that no longer exists.

Italy is a good example of this.

A history of violence

Italy is known for the violence it has experienced over the last 30 years of the 20th century, from far-left groups such as the Brigate Rosse (Red Brigades) to far-right groups (Nuclei Armati Rivoluzionari), along with the Mafia and other organised crime groups.

Italy experienced violent political terrorism that sought to change the State in order to affirm another idea of ​​State.

The anti-terrorism laws that still address the phenomenon were created based on that experience.

However, today's terrorism has nothing to do with the terrorism of that time, so old regulatory tools continue to be used to regulate a phenomenon that has changed.

This means that in order to provide an effective and up-to-date response to terrorism, we need to re-identify the phenomenon as it exists today and ask the basic question: “What is terrorism?”

In recent years, terrorism has proven to be flexible, adaptable and opportunistic. It is very adept at exploiting the enemy's vulnerabilities and is strengthened by this ability.

Europol, in its Terrorism Situation and Trends Report TE-SAT 2023, lists current types of terrorism and dangerous groups, and warns that “the lines between different types of terrorism, including right-wing, left-wing, anarchist, jihadist and other ideologies, are likely to become more blurred in the future.”

Europol reveals that points of convergence have already been observed between terrorists and violent extremists across the ideological spectrum.

Terrorism at the salad bar

Ideologically, today we can speak of Salad Bar terrorism (or mixed-ideology terrorism), where the ideological dimension is present, but is articulated according to personal taste, to justify the choice of the violent affirmation of one's own ideas.

However, the real reasons for terrorism are found in terrorism itself as a choice and action. They are found in the terrorists' conviction that only violence can change an already irrecoverable, urgent and dramatic situation. The personalized ideology that terrorists create for themselves is the justification for terrorist action and not the real motivation.

In this context, recruitment and propaganda are strategic pieces of the ideological puzzle: ideas must be recomposed according to a flexible and adaptable image that constitutes the stage in which the terrorist's violence will be expressed.

This fragmentation is the main characteristic of terrorism that affects the identity of young people (since young people are the main victims of terrorist propaganda and recruitment). A fragmentation in which geographical, political and cultural borders are no longer useful, reorganized by the global network of communication technologies.

More than ideology

The first challenge that arises is the need to reconsider the meaning of nation and State.

There are many paths to terrorism, which is why defining terrorism based on reasons and motivations does not work: the unpredictable ideology of the salad bar offers many ways to become a terrorist.

Ideologies no longer offer sufficient analytical categories to effectively identify and subsequently prevent threats. The reasons driving radicalisation today are multiple and stem from a variety of factors.

A good example of the failure to adequately address terrorism today are the numerous tools developed by law enforcement to identify potential terrorists: the so-called Terrorist Risk Assessment Tools.

All of this has so far led to poor results, because it is based on mistaken assumptions of continuity, linearity and ideal coherence, while the current Salad Bar Terrorism offers a circular, fast and unpredictable route, always original for everyone.

For example, the Australian Institute of Criminology recently published a report on the use of four risk assessment tools designed to measure the threat posed by radicalised offenders and, in some cases, justify their imprisonment or close supervision after their sentences have been served.

The AIC report concluded that there was a “relative lack of research into the effectiveness of these tools”, which it said was a “barrier to their use and undermines confidence in expert assessments that rely on these tools”.

There are often no credible signs to identify the “typical terrorist” until it is too late.

Today, a more effective method for identifying a potential terrorist risk might be to adopt a so-called “Digital Humint” approach, which analyses the “real” and “virtual” dimensions together, exploring not only the network of offline relationships and habits but also the ecosystem of social media and chat rooms.

A new approach

A new approach, which abandons the ideological dimension as the founding dimension of terrorism, is essential and means that “an act of terrorism is such because of the effects that it generates, not because of the causes that motivated it.”

This approach is not only supported by empirical results and failures of previous counterterrorism initiatives, but also has a theoretical basis in the field of crisis management, where a crisis is defined as an event whose effects are not controlled by a system.

It also has a practical basis, in seeking an agreement on “what terrorism is” by referring to the effects and damage it causes, on which an objective evaluation can be agreed upon, in complete harmony with the needs of the criminal justice system and the legal framework.

In the EU, terrorism is defined by its objectives of: “a) seriously intimidating a population; b) unduly coercing a government or an international organisation to perform or refrain from performing any act; c) seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation”, without any reference to a typology of ideological motivations.

Terrorism is no longer what it used to be, but those fighting it have not realized this. Bold decisions are needed to abandon outdated approaches and tools that no longer work.

What worked 50 years ago to combat terrorism in the 1970s and 1980s is irrelevant today, because contemporary terrorism bears little resemblance to its earlier manifestations. After all, human society has changed.